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Comments
COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE-
ENFORCEABILITPY UNDER MISSOURI LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Our economic system, much like our legal system, is a synthesis of
concepts that have proven their worth over many centuries. The heart of
a capitalistic system is competition. We depend on it to regulate supply
and demand which in turn sets prices and determines the optimum division
of labor. However, the common law quickly discovered that there were
certain types of "unfair competition" that could not be tolerated if the
economic system was to function properly. As a result, certain practices
were declared by the courts to be illegal per se.1 In many other situations,
the courts have left it to a party to protect himself by means of a re-
strictive covenant.2 This comment will discuss the enforceability of such
covenants and in particular those made ancillary to the sale of a busi-
ness or to an employment contract. Emphasis will be placed on the
Missouri law in this area and the factors which should be considered
in drafting such a covenant.
II. HisToIucAL DEVELOPMENT
The covenant not to compete has not always enjoyed the respecta-
bility, or at least tolerance, that it is accorded today. In the Dyer's Gase3
a dyer of cloth agreed that he would not practice his craft in a certain
town for six months. The medieval judge called on to enforce the con-
tract was astounded, declared it void, and stated: "By God, if the plaintiff
were here he should go to prison until he paid a fine to the king."4
The necessity of a long apprenticeship, the difficulty of travel, and the
scarcity of skilled workmen made enforcement of such contracts un-
thinkable.5
Over the centuries, the common law recognized a growing need for
such covenants. The early cases applied mechanical tests for determining
1. Trade secrets, for example, have been protected against appropriation
by former employees even in the absence of a prohibitory covenant. Likewise,
courts will enjoin the use of customer lists of a former employer. See 2 R. CALLMAN,
UNFAMR COMPEIMTON, TRADEmARKS AND MONOPOLIES §§ 52.1, 51.2 (c), 54.2,(c) (2)
(3d ed. 1968).
2. Thau-Nolde, Inc. v. Krause Dental Supply and Gold Co., Inc., 518
S.W.2d 5 (Mo. 1974), indicated the possibly disastrous consequences of failing to
provide the protection afforded by covenants not to compete.
3. Dyers Case, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. 5, F. 5, pl. 26 (C.P. 1415).
4. Id.
5. See Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 62 Abs. 17, 23, 105 N.E.2d
685, 691 (C.P. Ohio 1952), for a discussion of the factors existing at that time
which made the covenant unreasonable.
1
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the validity of "contracts in restraint of trade."8 Mitchel v. Reynolds7
was the first case to impose reasonableness as the standard for determining
the validity of covenants not to compete and to place upon the draftsman of
the covenant the burden of showing that the restraint was reasonable. 8
However, Mitchel did not completely abandon the older mechanical tests
and stated that a covenant containing a general restraint-i.e., one un-
limited as to time and/or space, was void regardless of the circumstances.9
Even prior to Mitchel, the cases treated covenants protecting an em-
ployer from unfair competition by a former employee differently from those
which attempt to protect the purchaser. of a going business.' 0 One issue
debated today is whether there really is a valid distinction justifying
separate treatment."' It appears that the "snow-balling weight of au-
thority" does recognize a difference, 12 and as a result courts are prone to
look with less indulgence on covenants ancillary to a contract of em-
ployment than on those accompanying the sale of a business.' 3 This
judicial discrimination takes one of two forms. First, a court may require
more justification for the former type of covenant before finding it to be
reasonable. Alternatively, the court may declare the restraint to be reason-
able, but require greater proof of irreparable harm before granting an
injunction. Missouri courts have used both methods to show what appears
to be a greater dislike for covenants ancillary to employment contracts.' 4
However, in Haysler v. Butterfield15 a Missouri appellate court seemed
to favor abandonment of the distinction, stating: "[T]he ultimate question
should be the same in both cases-what is necessary for the protection of
the promisee's rights and is not injurious to the public."' 0
6. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 I-IARv. L. REv. 625
(1960).
7. 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).
8. Id. at 349. The covenantee was forced to assume the burden to prevent
what the court termed the "mischief' caused by such restraints, namely, possible
loss of the employee's means of earning a livelihood, loss to society of the services
of a useful member, and possible monopolization.
9. 1 P. Wins. 181, 182, 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 348 (Q.B. 1711).
10. See Blake, supra note 6, at 630-32. But see Long v. Towl, 42 Mo. 545
(1868), and Mitchel v. Branham, 104 Mo. App. 480, 79 S.W. 739 (St. L. Ct. App.
1904), in which general restraints were stated to be ipso facto void.
11. Blake, supra note 6, at 637-38.
12. Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 62 Abs. 17, 35, 105 N.E.2d 685,
703 (C.P. Ohio 1952).
13. Samuel Stores, Inc. v. Abrams, 94 Conn. 248, 108 A. 541 (1919).
14. In Renwood Food Products, Inc. v. Schaefer, 249 Mo. App. 939, 223
S.W.2d 144 (St. L. Ct. App. 1949), the court stated that a covenant would not
be enforced merely because of competition by the former employee, but also
required a knowledge *of trade secrets or an influence over customers of the em-
ployer. In Jaccard Jewelry Co. v. O'Brien, 70 Mo. App. 432 (St. L. Ct. App. 1897),
it was held that a court of equity would not enjoin a breach of a contract for per-
sonal services unless the services rendered were unique, individual, and peculiar.
15. 240 Mo. App. 733, 218 S.W.2d 129 (K.C. Ct. App. 1949).
16. Id. at 130, quoting from 14 S. WiLLISTON, THE LAw oF CONmAcrs § 1643
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The essence of the distinction between covenants in employment con-
tracts and those accompanying the sale of a business is the effect of the
restraint on the covenantor.17 In the former there is seldom equal bargain-
ing power between the employee and the employer. As a practical matter,
the prospective employee is forced to sign what is placed before him and
receives no extra compensation for executing his covenant not to compete.
In many cases employees have been required to sign such agreements as a
condition of their continued employment.' 8 Because the employee is in no
position adequately to protect his future, the courts have done so by re-
quiring the employer to assure the court that enforcement of the covenant
will not result in an undue hardship on the employee. Such concern is
not as necessary for the seller of a business. He is in a much better posi-
tion to bargain than an employee and often a significant portion of the
price he receives is attributable to his agreement not to compete. Thus a
distinction does exist between the two types of covenants which may
justify different treatment in certain circumstances.
III. REASONABLENESS AS A STANDARD
As a result of the decision in Mitchel v. Reynolds,19 the "rule of
reason" was forever imprinted upon covenants not to compete. Reason-
ableness, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. Courts have given the
term various definitions. In Presbury v. Fisher20 the Missouri Supreme
Court was first asked to decide whether a covenant against competition
was void as an unreasonable restraint of trade. The court cited only
Mitchel and upheld the covenant, stating:
The liberality of our laws, in suffering everyman to engage in
any trade or occupation he may think best, without any previous
apprenticeship, has blunted our perception of the utility of the
principle which avoids contracts made in restraint of trade.2 '
In taking this laissez-faire attitude,2 2 the court seemed to approve the use
of broad covenants not to compete. This is evidenced by the fact that
another case on the subject was not brought before the court for fifteen
years. In Long v. Towl23 the Missouri Supreme Court gave its first in-
terpretation of the rule of reason, indicating a partial retreat from its
position in Presbury:
17. See pt. V of this comment, infra.
18. See, e.g., R. E. Harrington, Inc. v. Frick, 428 S.W.2d 945 (St. L. Mo. App.
1968); City Ice and Fuel Co. v. Snell, 57 S.W.2d 440 (St. L. Mo. App. 1933).
19. 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).
20. 18 Mo. 50 (1853).
21. Id. at 51-52.
22. The court in Presbury went on to state:
If there is an opening for any trade or business, how little is the com-
munity affected by the agreement of one that another should not engage
in it, when it is free for all others.
Id. at 52.
23. 42 Mo. 545 (1868).
1976]
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The prohibition should not extend any further than will fully pro-
tect the party for whose benefit the contract is made in his occupa-
tion or business. If the prohibition extends beyond this, it is an un-
reasonable restraint of trade, and will render the contract void.24
The early Missouri cases which followed, although attempting to
apply the rule of reason, established rather mechanical tests. One of
these tests was the general restraint-partial restraint distinction. It was
assumed that a restraint limited as to time and place was reasonable and
valid and one that was not so limited was void.25 Although some Mis-
souri courts quickly questioned the validity of this absolute rule,2 6 many
found it a convenient method to reach what was often a reasonable re-
suit.
In 1932 the Restatement of Contracts27 attempted to define the types
of contracts that were reasonable and those that were not. The draftsmen
explicitly rejected the general restraint-partial restraint test28 and let the
reasonableness of the particular restraint turn on the facts of each case.
The difficulty inherent in all attempts to define reasonableness stems
from the concept itself. Reasonableness is not a rule that can be applied
mechanically, but is instead a judicial balancing of conflicting interests. 2
Although Missouri courts seem reluctant to abandon certain of the ob-
jective tests,8O a better approach would be to weigh the interests of the
covenantor, -the covenantee, and the public, and to determine in light of
this evaluation whether the restraint in question is reasonable. The next
three parts of this comment examine these interests and attempt to ex-
plain their significance.
IV. REASONABLENESS AS TO THE COVENANTEE
The first interest to be considered in determining reasonableness is
the interest of the draftsman of the restraint. The buyer of an established
business generally acquires the goodwill 3 ' associated with it. This goodwill
is often due in large part to the efforts expended and relationships created
by the individual selling the business. As such, it is susceptible to de-
struction should the seller enter into competition with the buyer. Similarly,
the established business is continually striving to increase its goodwill,
largely through the efforts of employees hired to service old customers
24. Id. at 549.
25. Id. See also Mitchel v. Branham, 104 Mo. App. 486, 79 S.W. 739 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1904); Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Nemnich, 83 Mo. App. 6 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1899).
26. Peltz v. Eichele, 62 Mo. 171 (1876) (indefinite place); Gill v. Ferris, 82
Mo. 156 (1884) (indefinite time).
27. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 514-516 (1932).
28. Id. at § 515, comment c.
29. See Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 62 Abs. 17, 105 N.E.2d 685,
(C.P. Ohio 1952).
30. See, e.g., American Pamcor, Inc. v. Klote, 438 S.W.2d 287 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1969).
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and secure new ones.3 2 Thus competition by a former employee can
also deprive the employer of his investment in goodwill. Because of
the delicate nature of goodwill, the owner of a business is allowed to
contract to protect it much the same as he would contract to insure
his plant and equipment.33 However, just as one seeking insurance must
have an "insurable interest ' 34 in an asset, one seeking to protect good-
will may not contract for protection beyond its limits.35 Because the threat
of unfair competition3 6 is usually limited to a given area for a given
period, the factors of time and space are important.
A. Spatial Limitations
As a general rule, a spatial limitation may not exceed the area in
which the covenantee has a business interest. Most modern businesses
compete within a relatively small area, usually limited to the boundaries
of a particular city. It is conceivable that as cities grow ever larger, a
covenant restricting competition within a city may be beyond the needs
of the covenantee; 37 however, in the past Missouri courts have regarded
such restrictions favorably.38 As businesses grew to encompass larger areas,
the territorial extent of a "reasonable covenant" likewise grew. Many
covenants have been drawn to prohibit competition within the city limits
plus a radius of X miles from the city39 to protect against suburban com-
petition. Such restraints are also considered reasonable if the draftsman
can show that his protectable interest extends to the additional area.4 0
Companies operating in rural areas, and those doing business in
large metropolitan districts often find it impractical to use municipal
32. Trade secrets are similar to goodwill in that they are essential to achieving
and maintaining a firm's competitive advantage over its rivals.
33. House of Tools & Engineering v. Price, 504 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. App., D.
St. L. 1973); Prentice v. Rowe, 324 S.W.2d 457 (Spr. Mo. App. 1959).
34. Alexander v. Griffith Brokerage Co., 228 Mo. App. 773, 73 S.W.2d 418
(K.C. Ct. App. 1934).
35. "It must appear that such a contract imposes no restraint upon one
party that is not beneficial to the other." Long v. Towl, 42 Mo. 545, 549 (1868).
36. Renwood Food Products, Inc. v. Schaefer, 240 Mo. App. 939, 223 S.W.2d
144 (St. L. Ct. App. 1949), held that a covenant would not be enforced merely
because of competition by a former employee, but required a showing of factors
making such competition unfair.
37. For example, the buyer of a grocery store on the south end of Kansas
City would have trouble showing the danger of the seller opening a store in
North Kansas City.
38. Gill v. Ferris, 82 Mo. 156 (1884) (Mexico, Missouri); Peltz v. Eichele, 62
Mo. 171 (1876) (St. Louis, Missouri); Mitchel v. Branham, 104 Mo. App. 480, 79
S.W. 739 (St. L. Ct. App. 1904) (Portageville, Missouri).
39. Thompson v. Allain, 377 S.W.2d 465 (K.C. Mo. App. 1964); Hessel v.
Hill, 38 S.W.2d 490 (K.C. Mo. App. 1931).
40. In Thomspon v. Allain, 377 S.W.2d 465 (K.C. Mo. App. 1964), the
restrictive covenant excluded an opthamologist from practicing his profession
within 50 miles of St. Joseph, Missouri. The defendant opened an office in
North Kansas City, a distance of about forty miles. The court said that miles
meant air miles and found the restraint reasonable after finding that defendant
had treated 99 of his former patients from plaintiff's clinic in the thirty days
before the injunction was granted.
1976]
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boundaries as spatial restraints.4 1 The convenient alternative is to re-
strict -competition in a given county or counties. 42 Missouri courts have
allowed the use of county boundaries if the draftsman can show that his
business extends into any portion of the county.4 3 It appears likely
that in some cases the goodwill of a business may extend to a minor por-
tion of a neighboring county. To restrict competition in the total area
of that county would be of no benefit to that business and thus seems
unreasonable. However, because the Missouri courts have upheld such
restrictions in the past,44 this alternative may offer the greatest amount
of territorial protection for the smaller business.
Because the reasonableness of a spatial restraint is a function of the
interests of the business sought to be protected,45 a relatively large
business is entitled to a relatively large territorial restraint. In addition to
the size of a business, specialization may be considered in determining
the extent to which a business requires protection.4 6 In Harrington, Inc. v.
Frick4 7 an unemployment compensation consulting firm required its em-
ployees to sign a covenant restricting post-employment competition within
any state in which it was engaged in business at the time of the termination
of employment. The trial court enjoined two former employees from
engaging in any similar business in Ohio, Missouri, and Texas. The em-
ployees appealed, claiming that the restrictive covenant was geographically
broader than was necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interests.
The appellate court held the restrictive covenant "fair to all concerned,"
considering that the plaintiff, a specialized corporation with a limited
clientele, had over 1,900 customers in the three-state area.
48
Harrington is consistent with the general rule that a large territorial
restraint will be upheld if it can be shown that the draftsman's vulnerable
interests are coextensive with the forbidden area. Applying this rule,
courts have found a worldwide restraint to be reasonable,49 and have up-
held restrictive covenants covering the entire United States.5 0 However,
41. For example, the metropolitan area of St. Louis contains over 100 mu-
nicipalities in Missouri alone.
42. See Haysler v. Butterfield, 240 Mo. App. 733, 218 S.W.2d 129 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1944) (county boundaries used to prohibit competition within a metro-
politan area); Gordon v. Mansfield, 84 Mo. App. 367 (K.C. Mo. App. 1900) (use
of a county restriction in a rural setting).
43. Athletic Tea Co. v. Cole, 16 S.W.2d 735 (St. L. Mo. App. 1929).
44. See cases cited note 42 supra.
45. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
46. House of Tools & Engineering v. Price, 504 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. App., D.
St. L. 1973).
47. 428 S.W.2d 945 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968).
48. Id. at 950.
49. See Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., [1894]
A.C. 535, aff'g [18931 1 Ch. 630 (CA. 1892), in which the court held that a coven-
ant ancillary to the sale of a world-wide munitions firm which precluded the
seller from competing in a similar business anywhere in the world was reasonable
under the circumstances.
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at least one Missouri case 51 indicates that by seeking to overprotect his
interests the greedy draftsman may lose his protection entirely.
One method of limiting a post-employment restraint so as to be
reasonable without having to establish a territorial restraint is to draft
a covenant restricting former employees from soliciting clients of their
former employer.5 2 Such a restraint appears to be treated as reasonable
per se, because the goodwill of an employer dearly extends to his current
stock of customers,5 3 and the employee is not forbidden from opening a
competing business, even "at plaintiff's doorstep." 54
Notwithstanding the well-settled case law requiring a spatial limitation
to make a covenant reasonable, covenants are often still drafted without
such a limit.55 Such an omission will result in the invalidation of the
covenant. 56 It is also important to define clearly the extent of the ter-
ritorial restraint. If an ambiguity exists, the court will construe it against
the draftsman and invalidate what may be the most important part of
the restraint.5r The careful draftsman will make sure that his covenant
contains a clear and unequivocal spatial limit. He must also be sure that
he is able to show the necessity of the restraint.
B. Time Limitations
The general rules that apply to spatial limitations also apply to
time limitations in covenants not to compete. The time restraint may not
exceed that period during which the covenantee's goodwill is subject to
appropriation by the covenantor.58 The reasonableness of a time limitation
depends upon the length of this "vulnerable period." The distinction be-
tween time and space limits lies in the difficulty of ascertaining objectively
the period during which a former employee or owner retains substantial
influence over his former customers. As a result, courts seem to be
more lenient when considering a time restraint.
51. Mallinckrodt Chemical Words v. Nemnich, 83 Mo. App. 6 (St. L. Ct. App.
1899), affd, 169 Mo. 388 (1902).
52. See Mills v. Murray, 472 S.W.2d 6 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971):
It is universally recognized that an employer has a proprietary right in his
stock of customers and their good will and, if otherwise reasonable,
the courts will protect this asset against appropriation by an employee by
the enforcement of such a restrictive covenant not to compete.
Id. at 12.
53. See Mills v. Murray, 472 S.W.2d 6 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971).
54. Id. at 12.
55. Prentice v. Rowe, 324 S.W.2d 457 (Spr. Mo. App. 1959).
56. [W]e cannot find that the restraint imposed by the first restric-
tive covenant, wholly unlimited as to area, was reasonable and no greater
than fairly required for the protection of [the covenantees] who here seek
its shelter.
Id. at 461.
57. See Athletic Tea Co. v. Cole, 16 S.W.2d 735 (St. L. Mo. App. 1929), in
which the court refused to enforce a covenant restricting competition from "Im-
perial, Mo. and surrounding territory" and limited it to the city of Imperial only.
58. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
19761
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Missouri courts, although allegedly following a general rule,59 dis-
tinguish between covenants not to compete ancillary to the sale of a
business and those ancillary to an employment contract. When dealing
with the former, courts are likely to enforce vague, open-ended covenants, 60
and may even imply a time limit where none exists.61 On the other hand,
the latter must have a definite and reasonable duration.62
The same result would usually be reached by following the general
rule that the scope of a covenant may not exceed the covenantee's busi-
ness interest. 3 Several cases indicate that it is not unlikely that an in-
dividual who had sold an existing business or professional practice could
return many years later and establish a competing business, based heavily
on residual goodwill.64 The restraint needed in post-employment situations
is usually more limited, because the goodwill retained by an ex-employee
is usually more intangible. 65
Several recent cases involving employee covenants have found a
three year time limitation reasonable.6 6 Because the three year period is
evidently "safe," there is no apparent need to* resort to a shorter period. 7
However, a wise employer-covenantee should be prepared to substantiate
his need for any post-employment covenant with a term exceeding three
years.
V. R ASONABLENESS AS TO THE COVENANTOR
The Restatement of Contracts states that a covenant in restraint of
trade is unreasonable if it "imposes undue hardship upon the person re-
59. The general doctrine is that agreements in restriction of trade will be
upheld when the restriction does not go beyond some particular locality,
is founded on a sufficient consideration, and is limited as to time, place and
person.
Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Nemnich, 83 Mo. App. 6, 14 (St. L. Ct. App.
1899).
60. Gill v. Ferris, 82 Mo. 156 (1884).
61. Gordon v. Mansfield, 84 Mo. App. 367 (K.C. Ct. App. 1900).
62. Reddi-Wip, Inc. v. Lemay Value Co., 354 S.W.2d 913 (St. L. Mo. App.
1962); Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Nemnich, 83 Mo. App. 6 (St. L. Ct. App.
1899).
63. Long v. Towl, 42 Mo. 545 (1868). See text accompanying note 23 supra.
64. Gill v. Ferris, 82 Mo. 156 (1884); Gordon v. Mansfield, 84 Mo. App. 367(K.C. Ct. App. 1900) (doctor returned seven years after selling his practice only
to be enjoined by an indignant court).
65. Thau-Nolde, Inc. v. Krause Dental Supply and Gold Co., Inc., 518
S.W.2d 5 (Mo. 1974), is a sad example where even a one-year covenant might have
protected a plaintiff who lost most of its employees and customers to a business
established by a former employee.
66. House of Tools & Engineering v. Price, 504 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. App., D. St.
L. 1973); Mills v. Murray, 472 S.W.2d 6 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971); Harrington, Inc.
v. Frick, 428 S.W.2d 945 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968); Thompson v. Allain, 377 S.W.2d
465 (K.C. Mo. App. 1964).
67. This is especially true because Missouri courts have held, in both sale
and employment situations, that a court of equity has the power to limit an in-junction "to such duration as is necessary to give an employer fair protection of
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stricted."68 Missouri courts have recognized the existence of such a factor,69
but have rarely used it to invalidate restrictive covenants. This reluctance
may result from a judicial recognition of the mobility of the American
people and the assumed availability of comparable employment in another
field.7O In Haysler v. Butterfield7l the court applied this reasoning to the
facts before it and stated:
In enforcing the contract no particular hardship will be worked
as to the defendants, for they can be employed in any business
except that of employment agency and, in that business, anywhere
except within the area generally known as "Greater Kansas
City."7 2
Applying such a rationale, it would be- hard to envision a situation in
which "undue hardship" existed. However, in Willnan v. Beheler73 the
Missouri Supreme Court, although finding a restrictive covenant reason-
able and awarding monetary damages for its breach, denied an injunction,
arguably because of "undue hardship." Willman involved a medical partner-
ship agreement whereby the junior partner agreed not to practice medi-
cine in St. Joseph for five years after leaving the partnership. Upon being
dismissed, the junior partner continued to practice in St. Joseph for almost
five years. The court stated that it would be inequitable to enforce the
contract because during the existence of the partnership defendant had
become an "established -and recognized medical practitioner and sur-
geon."7 4 It appears that the court believed that the hardship imposed out-
weighed the covenantee's need for protection. The same reasoning seems
applicable to many potential covenantors who have become expert in a
specialized field and would have difficulty finding other employment.
VI. REASONABLENESS AS TO THE PuRUc
The interests of the public weigh both in favor of and against the
validity of covenants not to compete. Freedom to contract in this area is
essential in our economy, because without its assurance a prospective
buyer might be driven from the "going-business" market and a prospec-
tive employer from the labor market. On the other hand, the public policy
against attempts to restrain competition has been clearly shown by the
great amount of legislation in this area.75
68. RESTATEmNT OF CONTRACTS § 515 (b) (1932).
69. Prentice v. Rowe, 324 S.W.2d 457 (Spr. Mo. App. 1959).
70. Renwood Food Products, Inc. v. Schaefer, 240 Mo. App. 939, 223 S.W.2d
144, 151 (St. L. Ct. App. 1949).
71. 240 Mo. App. 733, 218 S.W.2d 129 (K.C. Ct. App. 1949).
72. Id. at 739, 218 S.W.2d at 131.
73. 499 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1973).
74. Id. at 778.
75. E.g., Sherman Anti-trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970); § 416.040, RSMo
1969. See also AmPicA BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIT ,
Disciplinary Rule 2-108 (1974), which states:
A lawyer shall not be a party to or participate in a partnership or em-
ployment agreement with another lawyer that restricts the right of a
1976]
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The result of the balancing of these conflicting policies is that a
restraint on competition will be tolerated only if it is necessary to protect
a legitimate business interest. Further public interests can enter into this
process, however, resulting in an otherwise reasonable covenant becoming
unreasonable and unenforceable. For instance, it has been stated that
if a contract tends to create a monopoly or deprive the public of an un-
usual talent or productive ability, it will not be upheld.76 Nevertheless,
Missouri courts have been reluctant to use such policy arguments to, strike
down covenants not to compete. Presbuy v. Fisher77 indicates the weakness
of such an argument in Missouri:
[T]here is no practical man who would not smile at the concept
that the public welfare would sustain an injury by enforcing an
obligation like that involved in the present case.78
It is worthy of note that Presbuty involved a covenant executed by the
seller of a counterfeit detector. Such an enterprise, due to its specializa-
tion, seems particularly susceptible to monopolization. Later cases cit-
ing Presbury also involved areas where the possibility of monopolization,
or at least public injury, was present.79
In a relatively recent case80 the breaching party to a covenant not to
compete argued that such covenants violate section 416.040, RSMo 1969,
which declares that all contracts that tend to restrain trade are against
public policy and void. Although several states have statutes declaring
void certain types of covenants not to compete, the Missouri statute has
been interpreted only to prevent such things as price-fixing and unlawful
combinations, many of which also are forbidden by the Sherman Act.81
Thus, in the absence of expanded legislation, the task of protecting. the
lawyer to practice law after the termination of a relationship created by
the agreement, except as a condition to payment of retirement bene-
fits.
Although not expressly stated, the Code of Professional Responsibility also ap-
pears to prohibit the use of covenants not to compete ancillary to the sale of
a law business. Cf. Ethical Consideration 4-6, which states that a lawyer should
not attempt to sell a law practice as a going business, and Disciplinary Rule 3-102,
which prohibits dividing legal fees with a non-lawyer (which, in effect, is what
the seller/ covenantor would become). Cf. also American Bar Association Comm.
on Professional Ethics, Formal Opinion No. 266 (1945) ("The goodwill of the
practice of a lawyer is not ... an asset, which either he or his estate can sell.").
76. Haysler v. Butterfield, 218 S.W.2d 129 (K.C. Mo. App. 1944).
77. 18 Mo. 50 (1853).
78. Id. at 51.
79. See, e.g., Gordon v. Mansfield, 84 Mo. App. 367 (K.C. Ct. App. 1900),
in which the court enjoined a physician who sold his practice from reentering
practice in the county as long as the purchaser remained there. The judge made a
comment that many rural residents would challenge today: "It is a social con-
dition, of which we may take notice, that physicians are quite a numerous class
of the population of the state. . . ." Id. at 377.
80. State ex rel. Schoenbacher v. Kelly, 408 S.W.2d 383 (St. L_ Mo, App.
1966). But see Reddi-Wip, Inc., v. Lemay, 354 S.W.2d 913 (St. L. Mo. App. 1963),
where the court indicated that the statute in question might apply to covenants
not to compete.
8L Gerecht v. American Insurance CQ., 344 F. Supp. 1056 (W.D. Mo. 1971).
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public from unreasonable covenants -remains one for the Missouri courts,
a task that in the past has perhaps been taken too lightly.
VII. REMEDIES FOR B EAcH OF A COVENANT
If the draftsman of a covenant not to compete can convince the court
that the covenant is reasonable based on the criteria described above, the
court should grant a remedy if it is breached.8 2 However, the remedy the
court chooses will often have as much bearing on the effectiveness of a
given covenant as the language of the covenant itself. When a covenant
is breached, the covenantee has two possible remedies. He can, as in any
action on a contract, sue for the monetary damages arising from the breach.
Although a court will often award money damages even though they only
approximate the actual damages,83 in many cases the intangible nature of
goodwill prevents the ascertainment of present and future damages. As a
result, the preferred remedy, and at times the only effective remedy, is
to enjoin the covenantor from further breaches.
Missouri courts faced with the demand for injunctive relief have
given varying amounts of consideration to the .appropriateness of this type
of equitable remedy. In Mills v. Murray8 4 a Missouri appellate court held:
The injunctive remedy is peculiarly appropriate to prevent
the violation of reasonable non-competition covenants, particularly
where, as here, the full damage to be suffered by the breach could
be estimated only uncertainly.8 5
This liberal attitude toward injunctive relief was followed in House of
Tools v. Price,8 6 where the court reversed the lower court's denial of
relief and issued a permanent injunction after- finding only that the
covenant was reasonable and that it had been breached. In State ex rel.
Schoenbacher v. Kelly8 7 the court discussed the affect of recent legislation
on the equity jurisdiction of Missouri courts and concluded that a circuit
judge had the power to issue and enforce an ex parte restraining order
prohibiting violation of a covenant not to compete. In that case the court
noted that equity has granted injunctions forbidding competitive em-
82. See Willman v. Beheler, 499 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1973): "Equity will not
suffer a Wrong to be without a remedy, and seeks to do justice and avoid in-
justice." Id. at 778.
83. In Mills v. Murray, 472 S.W.2d 6 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971), the court
stated:
In such a case, while the damages may not be determined by mere specula-
tion or guess, it will be enough if the evidence show the extent of the
damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result
be only approximate.
Id. at 17.
84. 472 S.W.2d 6 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971).
85. Id. at 18.
86. 504 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. App., D. St. L 1974).
87. 408 S.W.2d 383 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966).
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ployment following the breach of an exclusive services contract even in
the absence of a post-termination covenant.88
The recent case of Willman v. Beheler8 9 indicates that the remedy of
injunction will not always be available to enforce a covenant not to com-
pete. In that case, the covenant prohibited competition by an ex-partner
for five years after the termination of the partnership. However, litigation
to determine the validity of the covenant consumed four years, during
which the ex-partner continued to practice medicine within the proscribed
territory. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of a
five-year injunction. The court stated that a court of equity is reluctant
to grant a mere money judgment, but went on to hold:
The only feasible way in which Article XXII [the covenant
not to compete] may be enforced in favor of the covenantee and
at the same time protect the covenantor against an unjust penalty
is to remand the cause for a hearing on the question of Willmanks
financial loss arising out of competition with Beheler.90
Thus Willman stands as a warning to the injured covenantee to seek
injunctive relief imediately by means of a restraining order or a tem-
porary iinjuncton,, to ayoid risking the loss of any equitable remedy. In
order to claim the'alternative relief, money damages, the court in Willman
stated that the injured party must be prepared to show that his losses
were sustained as a natural, direct, and immediate result of the covenantor's
breach. In order: to meet this difficult and conceivably impossible burden
the prudent draftsman would do well to consider the inclusion of a liqui-
dated damages clause. Such a clause was apparently approved in dictum in
State ex rel. Schoenbacher v. Kelly.91 The result would be a covenant
which provides the court with two viable alternatives on which to com-
pensate adequately an injured covenantee. 92
-. 88. The leadifig case on injunctive relief under these circumstances is Lumley
v. Wagner, 1: De G., M. Sc G. 604, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852). Many jurisdictions
grn t injunctions to restrain violation by an employee of expressed or implied
negative covenants in' personal service contracts if the employee is a person of
"exceptional and unique knowledge, skill and ability in performing the service
called for in the contract." Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris, 348
S.W.2d 37, 42 ('rex. Civ. App. 1961). On the other hand, under Roscoe Pound's
separate significance of the negative" theory, injunctive relief should be denied
unless "breach' of the negative involves a damage by itself apart from. or over
and above the breach of the affirmative." Pound, Progress of the Law-Equity, 33
HARv. L. REv. 420, 440 (1920).
* 89. 499 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1973).
90. Id. at 778-79.
91. 408 SW.2d 383 (St. L. Mo. -App. 1966). Possible damages may.-be sub-
stantial, as in Thau-Nolde, Inc. v. Krause Dental Supply and Gold Co., Inc.,
518 S.W.2d 5- (Mo. 1974), where plaintiff claimed damages of over $117,000 as a
result of competition by former employees....
92. Including a liquidated damages clause in a covenant not to compete has
one potential danger. The breaching party could allege that the liquidated damages
clause provides an adequate legal remedy and thus injunctive relief should be
precluded. However, the general iule is' that the mere existence of. a liquidated
damages clause does not predude'injunctive relief. Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 23
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